The object of art1
Romildo do Rêgo Barros2
romildorbarros@terra.com.br
Abstract: Considering the object of art as one that
has no useful purpose, but produces something extra, the author compares
art and psychoanalysis. Each of them, in its own way, intends to find
a destiny to something extra that causes jouissance but cannot be confined
to shapes or words. He states that psychoanalysis meets art at the point
where the usefulness of objects is no longer immediate and requires
symbolic mediation.
Key words: Art; Psychoanalysis; object; ethics.
Resumen: Considerando al objeto de
arte como algo que no tiene utilidad pero que sin embargo produce algo
extra, el autor compara el arte y el psicoanálisis. Dice que
a su propio modo, cada uno intenta encontrar un destino para aquello
que el goce produce y que no puede ser confinado a formas o palabras.
Afirma también que el psicoanálisis se encuentra con el
arte allí donde la utilidad de los objetos no es inmediata sino
que requiere de una mediación simbólica.
Palabras Claves: arte; psicoanálisis; objeto;
ética.
You doubtlessly know the story of Apelles, a famous
painter of antiquity who, hidden behind a curtain one day, heard a shoemaker
commenting on the sandals that he had painted. Apelles accepted the
criticism and changed the sandals. The next day, the same shoemaker
criticized the shape of the leg. The artist then responded with a phrase
that became famous: ne sutor ultra crepidam, "Let the shoemaker
venture no further” This phrase, doubtlessly slightly cruel might
even be applied to me tonight . It does not mean that a shoemaker cannot
have an opinion about a work of art.
However, when speaking of matters different from professional specialization,
he would have to use other criteria: a shoemaker, as a shoemaker, can
only speak of footwear. Objects, as you well know, are generally classified
according to their usefulness. They serve some purpose. A polygraph,
for example, serves for writing. A polygraph is a condition to our writing
– not its cause, which is within us, but an instrument. A polygraph
does not foresee the inspiration for the text it writes, nor does it
need to know what it will write (unless someone like Edgar Alan Poe
tells us the story of a polygraph who writes by itself), but this does
not prevent it from leaving a mark on the surface of the paper, which
we interpret as writing. Putting it very briefly, objects serve some
body need , a subject’s body – an object always presumes
a subject. Our clothes serve to shelter our bodies; shoes protect us
from the hardness of the floor; polygraphs serve us for writing etc.
That is what we think, when we do not think much.
Usefulness is thus one of the conditions of the encounter between a
body and an object. Many times, usefulness even determines the shape
of the object. Through its design, for example, we can make its shape
compatible with its usefulness. Design, as everyone knows, is not restricted
to that, but that is also part of it; that is: a way of joining the
shape an object must have with its practical finality.
In principle, a shoe must have a shape opposite to that of the foot,
in such a way that it can serve as a container for the foot, which is
then contained. A shod foot is thus one unit made up of a vessel and
its contents. This can give us the impression that there is a complementarity
between bodies and the objects attached to bodies. Effectively, it seems
possible to think in terms of complementarity if we stick to usefulness.
Content can only be seen as content if it has a container with its own
formal characteristics. If we have a size-ten foot, we cannot wear a
size-nine shoe. The pain we feel indicates that there is difference
or distance between the contents and the container. Pain is the sensitive
aspect of this gap. As Freud used to say, referring to the anguish,
it is a sign. In other words, pain shows us that there is something
besides the encounter between body and object. There is something else.
We are no longer in the territory of complementary relationships. We
are closer to the plane of supplements. Pain is a sign of the supplementary
character of the meeting of body and object. If we previously had a
foot and a shoe, we now also have pain that does not properly belong
to the foot or the shoe. However, not only is pain situated in the territory
of the supplement, but also pleasure – above all certain pleasures
that get away from the body’s immediate needs and that we cannot
easily consider functional. We can think of sexual pleasure, which has
no precise object, and of the so-called aesthetic pleasure that is expected
from our encounters with that which is beautiful. That which exceeds
the complement equally exceeds the function, need and usefulness.
Something plus …
As an example, let us consider a famous Van Gogh painting that is known
to all and that was commented on by various thinkers and theoreticians,
as for example Heidegger in an article entitled “The origin of
the work of art”. The painting represents a rural woman’s
pair of shoes. They are used shoes that evidence signs of wear; that
is, they show us that there is a subject, who does not appear in the
painting, who wore or is still wearing them. Van Gogh’s painting
is situated in an interval between moments of using the shoes. Thus,
there is an object and a subject; at least supposedly, usefulness unites
the shoes and the rural woman. We can also believe that the sizes of
the shoes and of the rural woman’s feet agree. However, what happens,
what transformation occurs, when this very common object is represented
in a Van Gogh painting? This is the question I would like to place before
you tonight. We could ask the same question regarding the pipe that
Magritte painted in 1929, writing beneath it, “this is not a pipe”.
Effectively, the artist is right in saying that it is not a pipe because
one cannot smoke a painting. As faithful as the reproduction may be,
the painting is still unable to give the image the utility that the
reproduced object itself has. Something has changed between the object
that served as a model for the work of art and the work itself. In this
scene, something is added or, contrarily, something is subtracted. Finally,
the same question can be posed ever since Andy Warhol, one of the twentieth
century’s most well known American artists, created a series of
works in the 70s representing an object that could not be more common:
the Campbell’s soup can.
The artist’s soup cans are faithful reproductions of the cans
found in supermarkets, which one buys almost without thinking. Furthermore,
since Warhol painted objects in series (he has done the same with photos
of Jacqueline Kennedy, Marilyn Monroe etc.), his work also reproduces
a fundamental aspect of contemporary consumer objects; that is, they
are always seen in series, never individually. A can of Campbell’s
soup is always one of the millions of soup cans that feed the millions
of persons that do not need a face, a story or singular experiences.
It suffices that they have the habit of gathering cans in supermarkets
– and, supposedly, paying for them at the exit. Warhol not only
isolated an object from its group – purely ideal –, from
the things of this world, but also intended to give a singular character
to that which is least singular; that is, the grouping of consumer objects
that are manufactured, displayed and consumed in series, day after day,
person after person, can after can. As possibly always occurs in art,
Warhol confronts us with a paradox: as perfect as it may be, the reproduction,
imitation or copy, as Aristotle said in his Poetics, includes something
that surpasses the shape, need and function, but we do not know exactly
what this something is. Throughout the history of art, creators always
sought to transmit this certain something, sometimes approaching the
shape more, as Andy Warhol and many others did, sometimes keeping their
distance, as the impressionists did in a more radical way, those artists
that through their works broke away from the shape of mundane things.
This something plus , which we do not know very well what it is, seems
to be what characterizes art objects in the sense that art exhibits
that which cannot be contained by a shape or explained entirely. As
Walter Benjamin wrote in 1935, “an element is missing in even
the most perfect reproduction: the hic et nunc of the work of art, its
unique existence […]. It is in this unique existence, and only
in it, that the history of art develops” [1]. Benjamin called
this unique element of the work of art its “aura”; that
is, “the unique appearance of a distant thing, as near as it may
be” [2]. Benjamin believed that this aura would disappear with
the emergent possibility of the technical reproduction of art works,
mainly in movies and photography, but it is not very certain that this
is occurring. Something can take the place of the traditional aura and
sustain the uniqueness of contemporary art works.
Psychoanalysis and art
I think psychoanalysis and art, each in its own way, have a common intent
to give a destiny to this something extra that, although it cannot be
confined to shapes or words, is nonetheless essential; that is, it is
the cause of all that remains of that which we are able to say in words
or express formally. However, how can we situate this something else
without falling into the dominion of religion, which precisely situates
sublime objects that, by supposition, would be beyond human? How can
one identify as human, or essentially human, that which goes beyond
words? Benjamin used to say that that which we call an art object, before
expressing beauty, historically began as an instrument of worship, in
the beginning magic, and soon after, religious. Only later, with the
depletion of this ritual function, art objects became display objects,
things to be seen. We might think that, as they became display objects,
art objects lost – at least in part – their magic efficacy
and went on to represent something instead of being something. It seems
to me that this is where psychoanalysis meets art, where the usefulness
of objects is no longer immediate and requires symbolic mediation. Many
artistic works and perspectives, particularly in the field of plastic
arts, have emerged in recent times, which seem to remove art from the
strict field of beauty. It seems important to me to note that this tendency
of leaving Beauty impels art toward Ethics, in the sense that the act
and gesture of the artist are included in the definition itself of his
art, and goes on to be part of the work itself. We can attempt to enumerate
some of these tendencies: Instead of searching for beauty, for “the
splendor of form” as St. Thomas Aquinas used to say, many works
redeem the dimension of the waste. This deals not with raising the waste
upward – this “upward” forcibly has a religious inspiration
–, but more precisely with revealing dignity proper to the waste
as waste. I am thinking of someone like Franz Krajberg, who creates
his art using natural waste from Brazil’s Amazon, such as dead
roots and fallen trees. Likewise, I think of Andy Warhol, who with his
soup cans removed the sacred distance that used to separate objects
considered artistic from the common objects that industry offers to
the masses. This obligates psychoanalysts to define better what they
mean by sublimation. As Lacan teaches us, it is not the domestication
of art, aimed at achieving the acceptance of the average public opinion,
but the extraction of a certain essence of being that is inaccessible
outside of the arts – a new ordinance for the body, which in some
cases offers itself as an object or as artistic support, dissolving
the separation between the body and objects that has guided us for many
centuries. I am not referring to mutilating the body as a basis for
creating, or to exposing its desires – this would perhaps require
a separate discussion. Instead, I simply think, for example, of a work
that is a vessel for the body; that is, a work that, in order to be
seen, needs the spectator to go within himself, from whence he can only
watch it. During its short permanence, each body that goes within itself
is part of the work. And finally, a crisis or a certain declination
of authorship, which is manifested not only by way of collective creation,
but also in cases in which, as Benjamin used to say regarding Greek
statues, the work does not have eternity as its goal – that is,
ephemeral works whose authorship will disappear together with the works.
To a psychoanalyst, art is a privileged field of the subject-object
encounter in the sense of a convergence between the work and its creator
– not exactly by way of the subject’s imaginary identification
with its objects, but because the subject can find in the object the
exteriority that has always been its own. Precisely at this point, there
is an encounter between the consequences of the practice of psychoanalysis
and the effects of creation.
Translation by Heloisa Caldas.
1Conference
at the MAC - Miami Art Central, October 10, 2006, organized by NEL –
Miami.
2Analyst
Member (AME) of the Escola Brasileira de Psicanálise –
EBP.